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Abstract
This paper studies inference in a continuous-time game where an agent’s decision to quit an activity depends
on the participation of other players. In equilibrium, similar actions can be explained not only by direct
inﬂuences, but also by correlated factors. Our model can be seen as a simultaneous duration model with
multiple decision makers and interdependent durations. We study the problem of determining existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium stopping strategies in this setting. This paper provides results and conditions for
the detection of these endogenous eﬀects. First, we show that the presence of such eﬀects is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for simultaneous exits. This allows us to set up a nonparametric test for the presence of
such inﬂuences which is robust to multiple equilibria. Second, we provide conditions under which parameters
in the game are identiﬁed. Finally, we apply the model to data on desertion in the Union Army during the
American Civil War and ﬁnd evidence of endogenous inﬂuences.
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11. Introduction
In this paper we set up a continuous-time model to describe a multi-person decision problem
involving timing coordination. Individual strategies are exit (or entry) times to a certain
activity such as when to join a social welfare program, desert from an army or emigrate to
a diﬀerent region. After characterizing the equilibrium for such a situation, we assess the
empirical implications of the model in the presence of direct strategic eﬀects of a player’s
action on other agents’ choices. The main ﬁnding is that such endogenous eﬀects are nec-
essary and suﬃcient for simultaneous exits with positive probability. This has consequences
for the statistical treatment of such settings and for inference. We also show that in this
model the number of players impacts observed (equilibrium) outcomes only in the presence
of endogenous eﬀects. We then devise a test for the existence of endogenous eﬀects taking
into account the fact that time is not observed continuously but at discrete intervals. The
paper subsequently analyzes circumstances under which parameters of interest are identiﬁed.
Finally we illustrate the application of these tools with an analysis of desertion in the Union
Army during the American Civil War.
It is diﬃcult to explain why agents behave similarly when they do so. Individuals
may act similarly in response to correlated shocks or genuinely in reaction to each other’s
actions — a legitimate endogenous eﬀect.1 We analyze a situation in which agents take a
binary action and choose the timing for such an action. Crucially, correlated behavior may
arise through correlated eﬀects or through a direct impact on others.
One reason to properly account for endogenous eﬀects is that they might have dif-
ferent implications for policy than correlated eﬀects. Endogenous eﬀects may create “social
multipliers” and blow up the eﬀect of other factors determining behavior2. This may sig-
niﬁcantly alter the choice of treatments in policy-relevant situations like crime reduction,
welfare program participation or immigration. Imagine for instance a situation in which
agents choose when to join a certain welfare program. A person’s timing choice may be
determined by common factors or directly by the timing of other agents’ decisions (or both).
If the participation of one’s reference group — the endogenous eﬀect — is a suﬃciently
strong determinant for an agent’s choice, one could then concentrate eﬀorts on a subgroup
of community members and hope to aﬀect the remaining members as the focus group joins
the targeted activity. If on the other hand the main driver is common shocks that provoke
1Manski [31] provided a clear categorization for the possible causes of similarities in behavior and coined
the expression “reﬂection problem” to characterize the diﬃculties in separating endogenous and other social
and correlated eﬀects.
2For a recent exposition on this issue, see Glaeser and Scheinkman [16].
2participation by individuals, a policy-maker may prefer to identify and directly act on such
deﬁning variables.
In a timing framework, statistical inference would typically involve survival analysis
or duration models. Whereas standard statistical duration models could be employed to
identify the existence of hazard dependence among agents (as indeed is done in Costa and
Kahn [9] and Sikaraya [45] and suggested in Brock and Durlauf [6]), it is still unclear whether
such eﬀects are primarily due to endogenous inﬂuences or to correlated unobservables. In
contrast, our model clearly separates both channels and lays out the circumstances under
which each of these sources is individually identiﬁable. Another issue that arises in the par-
ticular setting studied in our paper — timing problems — is that endogenous eﬀects generate
simultaneous actions with positive probability in continuous time. This is an outcome that
does not occur in standard duration models. Failure to properly account for such phenomena
may bias estimation and misguide inference3.
Applications for the above tools comprise all those circumstances that focus on timing
coordination and would involve “duration”-type models with multiple agents. One may cite
for instance social welfare program participation, stock market participation (Hong, Kubik
and Stein [21]), migration (Orrenius [34]) and even crime recidivism (see for instance the
empirical investigation by Sirakaya [45], where social interactions are found to meaningfully
aﬀect recidivism among individuals on probation).
This paper contributes to the econometric literature on social interactions. At the
same time, it borrows standard tools utilized in the ﬁnance and investment literature for the
analysis of securities derivatives and real options. We review the relevant literature in the
following subsection.
1.1. Literature Review
In this paper we provide a model for timing coordination. Early references to such situa-
tions can be found for instance in Schelling [43], which discusses the timing of mob formation.
Our paper also relates to the threshold models of collective behavior in Granovetter [20], for
which “the costs and beneﬁts to the actor of making one or the other choice depend in part
on how many others make which choice.” Although that paper focuses on the binary nature
of the actions taken, a timing element exists in many of the examples gathered (diﬀusion of
innovations, strikes, leaving social occasions, migration and riot formation). We formalize
these ideas using tools of continuous-time probability models in which individuals choose an
optimal timing strategy to quit (or join) a certain activity. Our theoretical model is also
3See for instance Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder [46].
3connected to the one developed in Mamer [30] for a discrete-time setting and in a diﬀer-
ent framework4. As a result, our model is in the family of stochastic diﬀerential games —
continuous-time situations in which the history is summarized by a certain state-variable
(see Fudenberg and Tirole [14] (Ch.13) for a review of the literature on such games). This
literature is nonetheless more concerned with zero-sum games, whereas we focus on situ-
ations involving coordination elements. Our theoretical model can also be related to the
continuous time game presented in Hopenhayn and Squintani [22]. In their case the payoﬀ
ﬂows evolve discontinuously (according to Poisson processes) whereas in our case the utility
ﬂow is continuous with probability one. This distinction diminishes the role of beliefs with
respect to the opponent players in our case and turns out to be an important simplifying
element in our analysis. As is outlined later in the paper, the continuity of payoﬀ ﬂows is
also a crucial identifying assumption once we focus on the empirical content of the model.
In simple contexts it is usually diﬃcult to separate endogenous eﬀects from other
social forces (Manski [31]). This diﬃculty explains our search for structure in the speciﬁc
situation under analysis. Strategic interactions also pose an additional problem that may
hinder identiﬁcation and estimation: that of multiple equilibria. We circumvent this issue
in the present article by focusing on a speciﬁc equilibrium.
In order to construct the model and perform inference we use the tools of continuous-
time optimal stopping problems which appear in the investment and ﬁnance literatures. The
basic ingredients are explained in Dixit and Pindyck [10]. Whereas studies in this literature
do address the interaction of many agents, what distinguishes our model is a clear separation
between endogenous and correlated eﬀects.
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature on “duration-type” situations
with many interacting agents. One example is Sirakaya [45], in which the author investi-
gates duration dependence in timing of crime recidivism. Brock and Durlauf [6] cite other
applications such as the timing of out-of-wedlock births or ﬁrst sexual experience. Still, the
studies indicated there do not look at the endogenous eﬀect and focus instead on contextual
neighborhood variables. In their analysis of group homogeneity and desertion, Costa and
Kahn [9] discuss the possibility of a contagion eﬀect and try to account for it by introduc-
ing the fraction of deserters in a military company as a regressor (p.538). Although this is
indicative of endogenous interactions, without a structural representation one may contend
that it is still not clear whether the eﬀect captured is one of endogenous interactions or
4In his paper this author is mostly concerned with research and development investment applications in
which ﬁrms have complementary decisions.
4correlated eﬀects.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present the gen-
eral model and establish existence of equilibrium. Section 3 discusses and characterizes a
particular speciﬁcation for the model and sets the scene for Section 4, in which we discuss
the empirical implications of the model. In Section 5 we illustrate the previous discussion
with a dataset comprising Union Army recruits during the American Civil War. We obtain
evidence that there were endogenous eﬀects involved in the decision to desert the army and
estimate the model by simulation methods. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. The Model
As a mathematical model of the world, consider a probability space (Ω,F,P) in which a
given state of the world ω ∈ Ω is chosen according to a probability law P. There are I
agents. These agents take part in a certain activity (we will loosely use I to denote the set
of agents and its cardinality). A gain function (ui : R × [0,T] → R) captures the utility
an individual derives as he or she exits the activity. If an agent i ∈ I chooses to abandon
the activity at a time τi ∈ [0,T](T ∈ R++, where R++ = (0,∞]), he or she collects a
reward of ui(xi
τi,τi). The stopping strategies are represented by τi : Ω → [0,T], a (possibly
inﬁnite) stopping time with respect to an individual ﬁltration Fi = (Fi
t)t∈[0,T]
5 representing
agent i’s ﬂow of information. Although this information ﬂow arises endogenously in the
game, we assume throughout that the individual ﬁltration satisﬁes the usual conditions6.
Rigorously, a ﬁltration is a sequence of σ-algebras that speciﬁes how events are revealed over
time. Intuitively, a ﬁltration records one’s knowledge about the state of the world ω as time
evolves. The information to individual i at instant t consists then of all events summarized in
the collection Fi
t. We allow the individual information histories to diﬀer across individuals.
These individual information sequences will be the basis for an agent’s strategy since the
ﬁltration Fi = (Fi
t)t∈[0,T] incorporates the modeling assumptions one imposes on what each
agent knows or not as time evolves.
We assume that the individual state variable evolves as a process (adapted to the
Fi = (Fi
t)t∈[0,T] ﬁltration) which may depend directly on the participation of the remaining
individuals in the group. This direct inﬂuence represents the endogenous eﬀects in our model.
5A random variable τ : Ω → [0,T] is a stopping time with respect to (Ft)t∈[0,T] if, for each t ∈ [0,T],
{ω : τ(ω) ≤ t} ∈ Ft. Some authors use the term Markov time for this deﬁnition and refer to stopping times
as ﬁnite Markov times. In this paper we use inﬁnite and ﬁnite stopping times respectively for these objects.
Intuitively they represent stopping strategies that rely solely on past information.
6The ﬁltration is right-continuous and F0 contains all P-negligible sets in F.
5Let θi
t be the process representing the fraction of the population (excluding agent i) that has
abandoned the activity before time t. In other words, θi
t =
PI
s=1,s6=i I{τs<t}/(I−1) (with I{A}
as the indicator function for the event A ⊂ Ω). This process will be determined endogenously
as individuals choose the stopping times according to their preferences. Throughout we
assume that θi
t ∈ Fi
t: one knows how many players stopped up to (but excluding) the current
instant. Each individual state variable xi
t is assumed Markovian and is allowed to diﬀer across
individuals. The structure for the multi-person decision problem (payoﬀs, players, strategy
spaces and information assumptions) is presented in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Synchronization Game) A Synchronization Game is deﬁned as a tuple
hI,(Ω,F,F,P, (ui)i∈I,(xi)i∈I,(Ti)i∈Ii where I is the set of agents; (Ω,F,F,P), a ﬁltered
probability space; ui : R × R+ → R, an individual gain (utility) function; xi, an individual
adapted process having as state space R+; and Ti, a set of stopping strategies τ : Ω → [0,T].
Having deﬁned the basic structure of the problem, the idea is that each person i faces a
decision problem that is mathematically represented by the following (individual) optimal




















τ(ω)(ω),τ(ω)) with initial condition
given by xi. We assume that ui(x∞(ω),∞) = limsupt∈[0,T] ui(xt(ω),t).






















t is a Wiener process deﬁned in the particular probability space we are consider-
ing and the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients are assumed to be positive Borel-measurable
functions. The initial distribution F i
0 is furthermore independent of the Brownian motion
W i
t. We impose no restrictions on the contemporaneous correlation between the Wiener pro-
cesses7. The presence of any contemporaneous covariance accounts for the correlated eﬀects
7One could alternatively represent Wi
t as a linear combination of an I-dimensional (independent) Brow-
nian motion Bt for each i.
6in the model.
One important aspect of the assumed law of motion is that the state variable has con-
tinuous sample paths (P-a.s.). This allows us to treat individual beliefs about the position
of a counterpart’s state variable in a convenient manner (in contrast, for instance, to the
work by Hopenhayn and Squintani [22], where sample paths present discontinuities). Since
the stochastic utility processes evolve continuously, the probability that a given individual
reaches a stopping region in the state space between t and t +  conditional on not having
stopped before t vanishes as  → 0. As a consequence, where a counterpart’s state variable
is located becomes immaterial to the decisions taken within the next inﬁnitesimal period by
the agent.
In order to assure that, given a proﬁle of stopping times for each player, this stochas-
tic diﬀerential equation has a (strong) solution, we impose the following assumptions on the
drift and dispersion coeﬃcients:
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz and Growth Conditions) The coeﬃcients

















s=1,s6=i I{τs<t}/(I − 1) is adapted since θ is the aggregation of indicator
functions of events such as {τ < t}, where τ is an optional time with respect to the individual
ﬁltration8. Given the Borel-measurability conditions on the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients,
this guarantees that, for ﬁxed x, (t,ω) 7→ αi(x,θi
t(ω),t) and σi(x,θi
t(ω),t) are adapted. The
above assumptions guarantee the existence of a strong solution for the stochastic diﬀerential
equation (2). A sketch for the proof is presented in the Appendix. The following section
analyzes the existence of equilibria for this game.
2.1. Existence of Equilibrium
The solution concept we seek for this group situation is that of mutual best responses: a
standard Nash Equilibrium point. The equilibrium strategies are then a vector of I stopping
times such that each individual stopping time is optimal given the stopping rules adopted by
8An optional time with respect to a ﬁltration (Ft)t∈[0,T] is a positive random variable τ such that {τ <
t} ∈ Ft,∀t. A stopping time is easily seen to be an optional time. If the ﬁltration is right-continuous, an
optional time is a stopping time.
7the other agents. Denoting by τ = (τi)i∈I a stopping time proﬁle, let Ui(τ) = Exi[ui(xτi,τi)]
subject to the above transition laws and initial conditions and evaluated at the strategy
proﬁle τ. We also adopt the convention of using τ−i as shorthand notation for (τs)s∈I−{i}. A
Nash Equilibrium9 for the above game is then:
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium) A Nash Equilibrium for the Synchronization Game is a stop-
ping time proﬁle τ∗ = (τ∗





In order to proceed with the analysis of equilibrium, we make the following assump-
tions:
Assumption 2 (Exponential Discounting) Let ui(x,t) = e−γitgi(x),γi > 0,gi : R+ →
R,∀i ∈ I. We refer to gi(·) as the reward function.
Assumption 3 (Reward Function) The individual reward functions gi(·),
∀i ∈ I are assumed to satisfy:
• Monotonicity. gi(·) is increasing.
• Convexity. gi(·) is convex.
• E[supt∈[0,T] |e−γitgi(xi
t)|] < ∞.
• Twice diﬀerentiability. gi(·) is twice diﬀerentiable.
• Bounded derivative. The derivative g0(·) is bounded.
Assumption 4 (Bound on Volatility) For each t < ∞ and feasible proﬁle of stopping







Assumption 5 (Complementarity) The drift and the dispersion coeﬃcients are assumed
to be decreasing on their second argument: ∂θα(·,·,·) ≤ 0 and ∂θσ(·,·,·) ≤ 0.
9Since the strategies depend on information generated by the state variables and these are Markovian
and since optimization follows Bellman’s principle of optimatility in dynamic programming — whatever the
initial state and decisions are, the remaining decisions must be optimal with regard to the state resulting
from the ﬁrst decision — these are also Markov Perfect Equilibria. For a discussion of MPE, see Fundenberg
and Tirole [14], chapter 13.
8The Exponential Discounting Assumption (2) signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the manipulation and
is standard. The set of assumptions regarding the reward functions, (3), encompasses mono-
tonicity and convexity, which are not very controversial either (convexity is not necessary
if σ does not depend on θ for instance); a boundedness condition, which is employed to as-
sert the existence of a solution for the optimal stopping problem, and technical assumptions
that facilitate the application of existing results in the comparison of solutions for stochastic
diﬀerential equations. The Bound on Volatility Assumption (4) will imply that changes in
the proﬁle of stopping decisions will aﬀect the objective function only through the drift of
the discounted gain function. Finally, the Complementarity Assumption (5) expresses the
fundamental idea that higher participation makes the activity more attractive as well as
increases the volatility of the returns. This assumption imposes the idea that one agent’s
action is a strategic complement to the others’ actions. We are now ready to state the
following result10:
Theorem 1 (Existence) Under Assumptions 1-5, the Synchronization Game has a nonempty
set of equilibrium points and this set possesses a maximal element.
Proof. See Appendix.
Under such general conditions, little can be said regarding uniqueness and other
properties of the model. In the next section we make further assumptions on the structure
of the game.
3. A Coordination Game
We now specialize the model and extend the analysis developed so far. Consider initially
a hypothetical game where agents contemplate the possibility of exit. As before, a state
variable x (which is assumed to evolve according to a certain stochastic process) represents
the latent utility a player collects when abandoning a certain activity. At exit, he or she pays
a cost C. The strategy is then a rule dictating his or her exit decision using the available
information at the time. Given a discount rate γ, the objective for the agent is to maximize
the reward function Ex[e−γt(xt − C)].
At an initial stage consider the individual problem where the state variable x changes
10Mamer [30] obtains existence of equilibria in a similar (but more restrictive) game in discrete time
through similar techniques.
9according to the following law:
dxt =
(
αxtdt + σxtdWt if t ≤ ν
(α − ∆α)xtdt + σxtdWt if t > ν
where ∆α ≥ 0 and ν is an exogenously given random time. We assume that the individual
observes Wt and whether or not the random time occurred up to (but excluding) time t. In
other words, Ft = σ(xs,Iν<s,s ≤ t). The initial condition is drawn from an independent
distribution F0 as in equation (2). Notice that the break point for the drift here is exogenously
given. At a later stage we will endogenize this stopping time to make it dependent on the
decision by the other participants. For there to be a well-deﬁned solution to this problem,
we assume that γ > α.
Let x be the process corresponding to ν(ω) = ∞,∀ω ∈ Ω (i.e. a geometric Brownian
motion with drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients αx and σx) and x be the process corresponding
to ν(ω) = 0,∀ω ∈ Ω (i.e. a geometric Brownian motion with drift and diﬀusion coeﬃcients
(α − ∆α)x and σx). We can use dynamic programming to show that the optimal stopping
times for these two processes are characterized by threshold levels z = z(α,σ,C,γ) and











+ 2γ/σ2 > 1
(see Dixit and Pindyck [10], p.140-144). The agent will stop the process as soon as it hits the
level z. For notational convenience, we omit the parameter dependence of z in the remainder
of the section.
Given a random time ν, we propose the stopping rule characterized by the following
continuation region:
{x ≤ z ≡ z(α,σ,C,γ;∆α,t,other parameters)} if t ≤ ν
{x ≤ z} if t > ν
(5)
where the threshold levels z are determined from value matching and smooth pasting con-
siderations in the optimal stopping problem (see the proof for Proposition 1). The “other
parameters” refer to parameters related to the hazard rate associated with ν (as perceived
by the agent). If ν arrives at a constant hazard rate λ, for instance, the threshold is constant
in time and depends on the arrival rate λ and the decay in the drift ∆α. Once ν arrives,
10the process starts afresh and one is better by adopting the lower threshold rule. This rule is
easily extended to processes with multiple breaks at increasing stopping times. It delivers a
stopping strategy by which the agent switches progressively to lower threshold levels as the
drift breaks take place. We thus state the result for the more general case:




where ∆α ≥ 0,α,σ > 0,t ∈ R+,n ∈ N,W is a standard Brownian motion and {νk}k=1,...,n is
an increasing sequence of stopping times. The optimal continuation region for the stopping
problem is given by
{x ≤ zk−1} if t ≤ νk,k = 1,...,n
{x ≤ zn} if t > νn
for some threshold levels zk ≡ zk(t) with zk(t) > zk+1(t), ∀t k ∈ {1,...,n−1} and zn ≡ z.
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider now a game with two agents indexed by i = 1,2. They both contemplate
an exit decision that will cost them Ci,i = 1,2. In return, they collect a value xi,i = 1,2,
just as in the previous setup. The diﬀerence is that now the latent utility process for one
agent is negatively aﬀected once the other agent decides to leave the activity. In analogy
with the previous individual setup, we consider a situation in which each player observes his
or her own state variable process and whether or not the other agents stopped or not up to
but excluding the current instant.













t if t > τj
where i,j = 1,2, i 6= j and τj is the stopping time adopted by the other agent in the game
and, as above, γ > αi. Notice that the contemporaneous correlation between the Brownian
motions is left unconstrained and that ∆αi measures the external eﬀect of the other agent’s
decision on i. As pointed out in the previous section, this reveals the two major aspects of
group behavior under consideration in this study: correlated and endogenous social eﬀects.
Individuals might behave similarly in response to associated (unobservable) shocks, which are
reﬂected in the possibility that the increments of W i
t and W
j
t are correlated. This represents
the correlated eﬀects. On the other hand, agents may be directly aﬀected by other agents’
11actions as well. This would appear as a decrease in the proﬁtability prospects an agent
derives by remaining in the game. This is the endogenous eﬀect.
The previous analysis establishes that each agent will use the “high drift” optimal
stopping rule characterized by the (moving) threshold zi ≡ zi(t) while τj ≥ t. As soon as
τj < t, she switches to the “low drift” stopping rule characterized by the threshold zi. In this
case though, we need to handle the fact that τj is not exogenously given, but determined
within the game. It is illustrative to portray this interaction graphically.
Figure 1 displays the X1 ×X2 space where the evolution of the vector-valued process
(x1,x2) is represented. Since ∆αi > 0,i = 1,2, we should have zi(t) > zi,i = 1,2. As in
the previous analysis, agents start out under threshold zi(t). If the other agent stops, the
threshold level drops to zi. In Figure 1 for instance the process ﬂuctuates in the rectangle
(0,z1) × (0,z2) and reaches the barrier z1 causing agent 1 to stop. Once this happens,
agent 2’s threshold drops to z2, which once reached provokes agent 2 to stop. A symmetric
situation occurs if we interchange the agents roles.
FIGURE 1 HERE
A more interesting situation is depicted in Figure 2. Here, the vector process sample
path attains the upper threshold for agent 1 at a point where x2 ≥ z2. The second agent’s
threshold moves down immediately and both stop simultaneously. So, if an agent’s latent
utility process is above the subsequently lower threshold when the other one drops out,
there will be clustering and they move out concomitantly. This is an interesting feature
of the game which is not present in standard statistical models that would handle timing
situations as the one at hand: the positive probability for simultaneous events even when
time is observed continuously. If not properly accounted for, this can bias results towards
erroneous conclusions 11.
FIGURE 2 HERE
One concern in the analysis of this interaction is how beliefs about the state of one’s
opponent should aﬀect his or her actions. If an individual knows only whether or not the
opponent has quit, how should he or she take into consideration the risk of being preempted?
Should the player take the presence of the opponent for granted and delay the decision to quit
or must he believe that the other agent is about to quit the game and hence leave the activity
11Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder [46], for instance, point to a negative duration dependence bias
in estimates if simultaneity is left unaccounted.
12immediately? Such considerations point to the importance of beliefs in these environments
and are a relevant consideration in Hopenhayn and Squintani [22], for instance. In the present
case, such calculations are of lesser importance since the state variables evolve continuously.
This implies that the likelihood that an agent reaches a stopping region between now (t)
and an  unit of time in the future (t + ) vanishes as  → 0 (as is the case with the hazard
rate for an Inverse Gaussian random variable). Consequently, the beliefs about the location
of the opponents’ state variables are of second order to the decisions taken within the next
inﬁnitesimal period by a given agent.
The intuition above carries over with more than two agents. In order to state this
result in more generality, assume as before that an exit decision costs an agent Ci,i ∈ I in














t, i ∈ I
where τj is the stopping time adopted by the agent j. Notice that the external eﬀect of other
agents on i is given by ∆αi > 0 and is considered to be homogeneous across agents, i.e. the
amount by which the drift αi decreases with each stopping decision is the same regardless
of who deserts.
A few other deﬁnitions are convenient:
zi
m : z(αi,σi,Ci,γi,m,∆αi,t) where i,m ∈ I
Sm : {(x1,x2,...,xI) ∈ RI
+ : ∃i such that xi ≥ zi
m}where m ∈ I
τ0 : 0 (meaning τ0(ω) = 0,∀ω)
A0 : II (identity matrix of order I)
τm : inf{t > τm−1 : Am−1xt ∈ Am−1SI+1−10Am−11} where Am−1SI+1−10Am−11
denotes the set formed by operating the matrix Am−1 on each





m if k = l = i and am
kl = 0 otherwise and
m ∈ I
The stopping times deﬁned above are essentially hitting times. The thresholds zi
m are deﬁned
by the value matching and smooth ﬁt conditions (see the proof of Proposition 2 for details).
The idea is that the game starts out with no defection and agents hold the highest
barrier zi
1(t) as the initial exit rule. The ﬁrst exit then occurs at τ1, which is the hitting time
for the stopping region S1. As the vector process reaches this set, one or more agents will
quit. This will shift the stopping thresholds down as well as the stopping region moves to S2.
13In order to track the players who drop out at τ1 we utilize the matrix A1. This is a diagonal
matrix with ones for those agents who did not drop out at τ1 and zeros, otherwise. Proceeding
analogously through further stopping rounds, defections will occur at the stopping times τ·
and 10A·1 basically records the number of agents that have not stopped after that stage.
This goes on until all agents have stopped. The following proposition summarizes our result:
Proposition 2 The proﬁle (τ∗
i )i∈I represents a vector of equilibrium strategies for the exit














This proposition states that the hitting times constructed previously may be used
to represent an equilibrium for this game. For the reasons discussed in the next subsection,
this is the equilibrium we focus on in this paper.
3.1. On Multiple Equilibria and Equilibrium Selection
In this subsection, we argue that the above equilibrium is the only equilibrium which is robust
to positive delays in information about the exit of others. As we drive this delay to zero,
this parallels the intuitive idea that each agent observes his or her own state variable process
and whether other agents stopped up until but excluding the current instant t: stopping
decisions are observed with an “inﬁnitesimal” delay.
If one agent’s exit is perceived with a delay, dropping out may not elicit other players’
exit. The proﬁtability of remaining in the game, represented by the drift coeﬃcient, would be
unchanged. Then, exit would only be optimal on the equilibrium portrayed in the previous
subsection. This “synchronization risk” is inherent in many similar situations (see Abreu
and Brunnemeier [1], Brunnemeier and Morgan [7] and Morris [33]). In fact, the following
quote presents one of the earliest discussions of this problem:
It is usually the essence of mob formation that the potential members have to
know not only where and when to meet but just when to act so that they act in
concert. (...) In this case the mob’s problem is to act in unison without overt
leadership, to ﬁnd some common signal that makes everyone conﬁdent that, if he
acts on it, he’ll not be acting alone. (Schelling [43])
14In order to formalize this intuition, consider the case of two players (I = 2) and a vector-
valued random variable (i)i∈I representing the agents’ perception delay. Let an individual’s












t if t > ν
where i,j = 1,2, i 6= j and ν = τj + i is the stopping time adopted by the other agent in
the game with an i delay and, as before, γ > αi. The following statement then holds:
Proposition 3 Assume that P({i > 0}) = 1,i = 1,2 and P({1 = 2}) = 0. Also, let
S(t) = {(x
1,x
2) : ∃i such that x
i ≥ z
i(t)}
and τS = inf{t > 0 : (x1
t,x2
t) ∈ S(t)} denote the hitting time for this set. The stopping








τS6=zi, i = 1,2.
Proof. See Appendix.
As i
P −→ 0, the above strategies converge to the strategy depicted in Proposition
2. For this reason, we restrict our attention to the unique equilibrium which is robust to
such perturbations and corresponds to the one displayed in the last subsection.
We draw attention to the fact that other information structures would nonetheless be
susceptible to multiple equilibria.12 One point that is worth noting is that the occurrence of
joint exit with positive probability is robust to the existence of multiple equilibria and the
issue of equilibrium selection. Given this, we point out that some of our results in this and
the subsequent section are robust even to the existence of multiple equilibria. In the next
section, we discuss the empirical implications of the model.
4. Empirical Implications
In this section we investigate the empirical implications of the model. We have in mind
a sample in which the unit of observation is a game13 and N such units are recorded.
Recall that, by endogenous eﬀects, we mean the eﬀect of other agents’ participation on
12A discussion of this is can be found in a longer version of the paper available at the author’s website.
13In our empirical application a game is a military company. In other applications, it would a household
or a geographic market or some other arena of interaction for the agents under analysis.
15the transition law for the individual state variables. Correlated eﬀects refer to the possible
contemporaneous correlation between the Brownian motions that drive the individual latent
utility processes. We restrict attention to the unique equilibrium depicted in the previous
section, which is robust to perturbations in the timing at which agents become aware of the
actions of other players.


















0, i ∈ I
where τj is the stopping time adopted by the player j. The cross-variation process for the
Brownian motions is given by hW i,W jit = ρt,i 6= j and the initial condition x0 = (xi
0)i∈I
follows a probability law F i
0. It is assumed throughout that |ρ| < 1.
The individual initial drift coeﬃcient is potentially a function of an l-dimensional
vector of individual covariates wi(1×l), which is independent of the Brownian motion. More
speciﬁcally, αi = α(wi). In beneﬁt of readability, we suppress the argument and denote
the drift by αi. Let Fw denote the distribution of w = (wi)i∈I. In what follows all the
statements are conditional on w = (wi)i∈I. The parameter ∆α measures the external eﬀect
of the other agents decisions on i and introduces endogenous social eﬀects. The coeﬃcient ρ
represents correlated social eﬀects. In addition to the above parameters, each agent pays a
cost C to leave and discounts the future at the exponential rate γ. Finally, zi,i ∈ I denotes
the threshold presented in the previous section.
4.1. Characterization
We are now in shape to look at the outcomes in the presence of interactions and correlated
eﬀects. The next proposition states that simultaneous departures only occur in the presence
of endogenous eﬀects.14
Proposition 4 P[τi = τj,i 6= j,i,j ∈ I] > 0 if and only if there are endogenous eﬀects
(∆α > 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
This is a useful feature of this model and holds in many empirical situations in which the
model applies. Moreover, this empirical implication does not rely on the uniqueness of the
14This proposition does not depend on the fact that ∆αi = ∆α,∀i. It nonetheless relies on the assumption
that ∆αi > 0,∀i.
16equilibrium. Notice that traditional econometric models in duration analysis typically do
not generate clustering in timing, i.e. the probability of simultaneous exit is zero and such
incompatibility may provoke biased estimates and contaminate conclusions.
This result relies basically on the continuity of the sample paths for the stipulated
process. If discontinuities are allowed, this may not hold any longer15. The problem would
nonetheless be diluted if one knew the timing of such shocks. If one observes clustering in
other moments, this is evidence in favor of endogenous eﬀects.
Another implication is that the number of players should aﬀect equilibrium stopping
outcomes only in the presence of endogenous eﬀects. This is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 If the number of players I aﬀects the marginal distribution of equilibrium
stopping times in the game, then there are endogenous eﬀects (∆α > 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that the direction in which the equilibrium stopping times are aﬀected is
not clear. If, on the one hand, the presence of more players will cause each one’s exit to have
a smaller impact on an agent’s latent utility process; on the other hand, exits will tend to
occur earlier.
4.2. Nonparametric Test for Endogenous Interactions
If time were recorded continuously, Proposition 4 would suggest that observing simultaneous
exits would be enough to detect endogenous eﬀects. When time is marked at discrete intervals
though, exit times would be lumped together regardless of the existence of endogenous
inﬂuences. In this subsection we explore the possibility of testing for the existence of social
interactions taking into consideration that time is not sampled continuously.
Let n = 1,...,N index independent realizations of the game and denote by In the
number of players in realization n. Time is observed at discrete intervals of stepsize ∆N.
Given a discretization {t0,t1,...} such that ti+1 − ti = ∆N,∀i, we denote the probability of
a simultaneous exit by any pair of players
P∆N({ simultaneous exit }) = p(∆N)
and allow the discretization to depend on the sample size.
Imagine that there are no endogenous interactions. In this case, for a small enough
15One way to introduce such discontinuities is to insert an exogenous jump component dQi in equation
(2). In this case, beliefs would play a more signiﬁcant role.
17discretization, doubling the observation interval would roughly double the probability of
of recording exits as simultaneous. If these endogenous eﬀects are present, since even at
continuous-time sampling there would still be clustering, doubling the discretization does
not increase the probability of joint exit by as much. In the limit, if all exits are indeed
simultaneous in continuous time, varying the grid of observation would have no eﬀect on the
probability of observing simultaneous dropouts. We use this intuition to develop a test for
the presence of endogenous eﬀect through variation in the interval of observation.
In our model, when there are no endogenous eﬀects, the function p(·) can be seen
to be continuous and such that p0(·) > 0. Also notice that p(0) = 0 when there are no














where πn is the set of all player pairs in game n and τi
∆N is the exit time observed when
the discretization grid size is ∆N. If the game has only two players, yn,∆N records whether
there was simultaneous exit under a discretization of size ∆N. It can be established that
E(yn,∆N) = p(∆N). For In = 2 it can also be seen that var(yn,∆N) = p(∆N)(1−p(∆N)). For
the general case, we denote var(yn,∆N) = v(∆N). It is easily seen that p(0) > 0 ⇒ v(0) > 0
and p(0) = 0 ⇒ v(0) = 0. Given the observation of N i.i.d. copies of such games, one is
then invited to consider yN,∆N = N−1 PN
n=1 yn,∆N. The following result is then established:
Theorem 2 Assume
1. p(·) is diﬀerentiable and p0
+(0) > 0 if p(0) = 0;
2. ∆N,i = aiN−,i = 1,2,3 with a1 < a2,a3(a2 6= a3), and 1/3 <  < 1;
3. The games observed are i.i.d..


















































































+(·) denotes the right-derivative of function p(·). The smaller and the closer ∆N,1
and ∆N,2 are, the higher the precision for the ratio is.16 Also, in estimating the asymptotic
variance, one could use as consistent estimators the sample counterparts:
\ p(∆N,j) = y∆N,j j = 1,2
and the sample variance covariance matrix across the games.
Since it relies on Proposition 4, the above result is also robust to the existence of
multiple equilibria (as long as the equilibrium played is the same across the games sampled).
In the next subsections we explore some representation and identiﬁability properties under
the assumption that the equilibrium played is the one characterized in the previous section.
4.3. Identification
One question that arises naturally is the possibility of disentangling correlated and endoge-
nous eﬀects in the data. The econometrician presumably observes the equilibrium exit
strategies (τ1,...,τI) for a certain number of realizations of the game. What parameters of
the model can be retrieved given data on the situation under analysis? Could two diﬀerent
parameter vectors generate the same distribution for the data? Let τ denote some outcome
variables observed by the researcher; and w, some observable covariates. A parameter ψ (of
arbitrary ﬁnite dimension) lies in a certain set Ψ and governs the probability distribution
P(·|w;ψ) of the outcome variables. The following deﬁnes identiﬁcation.
Deﬁnition 3 (Identiﬁcation) The parameter ψ ∈ Ψ is identiﬁed relative to ˆ ψ if ( ˆ ψ / ∈ Ψ)
or (P(·|w;ψ) = P(·|w; ˆ ψ),Fw-a.e. ⇒ ψ = ˆ ψ).
16As it relies on Assumption 2, the power of the test may be aﬀected by the coarseness of the data in a
non-negligible manner. This is an issue as well for related techniques in continuous-time ﬁnance as well as
in the empirical game estimation literature. Our empirical application employs data at a daily frequency,
which is a appropriate for the phenomenon investigated.
19The ﬁrst stand on identiﬁability for the model above is a negative one: the full
parameter vector is not identiﬁed. To see this, notice that with no social interactions or
correlated eﬀects (∆α = 0 and ρ = 0), the individual Brownian motions are independent
and each agent’s latent utility process evolves as a geometric Brownian motion with drift
αi, diﬀusion coeﬃcient σ and initial position xi. As a consequence, the exit times τ∗
i are
independent (possibly defective) Inverse Gaussian random variables17. This distribution is
characterized by two parameters for which the mean and harmonic mean are maximum
likelihood estimators and minimal suﬃcient statistics. Since we would still have more than
two parameters (α,σ,C,γ), the model remains unidentiﬁed.
Under certain circumstances though, some positive assertions about the parametric
identiﬁcation for this model can be made. Identiﬁability may be achieved if one is able to
introduce “enough variability” through the use of covariates. Recall that we assumed αi =
α(wi) where wi is a set of covariates. Let g(t;ψ,w) denote the probability density function
for the ﬁrst desertion time under the parameters ψ = (x,β,σ,ρ,γ,C) and conditioned on
the observable covariates w. The following statement establishes suﬃcient conditions for the
identiﬁcation of ψ. It basically states that relative identiﬁcation is achieved if, by perturbing
the covariates, one perturbs the Kullback-Leibler information criterion, which is a measure
of how far apart two probability distributions are18.
Theorem 3 Let wi contain at least one continuous random covariate, α(·) be C1 with respect







g(t;ψ,w)dt 6= 0 (6)
then ψ is identiﬁed relative to ˆ ψ.
Proof. See Appendix.
17The Inverse Gaussian is the distribution of the hitting time of a Brownian motion on a given barrier
logz. In our case, the initial position is logxi; the drift coeﬃcient, αi −σ2/2 and the diﬀusion coeﬃcient, σ.
If αi − σ2/2 the barrier is reached in ﬁnite time with probability one. Otherwise, with a certain probability
the barrier is never reached and, conditional on hitting the threshold, the distribution of the random time
is an Inverse Gaussian. Whitmore [48] names this last case a defective Inverse Gaussian. Chhikara and
Folks [8] provide an extensive characterization of the Inverse Gaussian distribution.
18Another potential avenue for identiﬁcation would be through the results presented in McManus [32].
With a suﬃciently high number of players (corresponding to endogenous variables) relative to the parameters
of the model, the structure can be seen to be (generically) identiﬁed.
20In order to check condition (6) one should obtain the density g19 . One possible
route is to use the close association between the theory of stochastic processes and the study
of diﬀerential equations20. We assume that the equilibrium played is the one selected in the
previous section. Because the equilibrium strategies can then be expressed through hitting
times to certain sets, it is possible to characterize the probability density of interest through
associated partial diﬀerential equations. As in the previous section, let zk(αi,σ,γ,C,∆α,t)
be the optimal threshold levels deﬁned in Proposition 2. Here, G(t,x) is the probability that
the players will abandon the activity after time t when the vector of initial conditions is
given by x. The density g(·) can then be obtained as −dG(·)/dt. The following result then
holds21, 22:
Proposition 6 Let G(t,x) = P[τ∗
i > t,i ∈ I|x0 = x]. Then G is the unique solution to
∂G/∂t = [A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ) + L1((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α,t)]G in Ct=0,t > 0
G(0,x) = P(τ∗
i < ∞,i ∈ I),x ∈ Ct=0
G(t,x) = 0,x ∈ ∂St=0 and t ≥ 0
where St=0 = {x ∈ RI





























which is the inﬁnitesimal generator for the I-dimensional diﬀusion representing the latent













Under certain conditions, namely αi − σ2/2 > 0 for some i, P(τ∗
i < ∞,i ∈ I) = 1. If
not, it can be obtained from another partial diﬀerential equation (a proposition similar to
the one just displayed can be stated for this case) or directly estimated from the data.
19When ∆α = ρ = 0, the Kullback-Leibler information can be obtained in closed form from the Inverse
Gaussian probability density function.
20For an introduction to the interplay between diﬀusion processes and partial diﬀerential equations, see
Karatzas and Shreve [25].
21In certain special cases this solution may be available analytically. This is the case when there are only
two players or when there are no interaction eﬀects.
22We conjecture that, in the presence of discontinuities, a similar result may be attained relying on partial
diﬀerential equations for the characterization of equilibrium exit distributions.
215. Empirical Illustration: Desertion in the Union Army
Using a dataset comprising detailed individual records for soldiers of the Union Army in
the American Civil War23, we now intend to illustrate the previous discussion on stopping
decisions and timing coordination. Desertion is the event we are interested in. Historians
estimate that desertion aﬄicted a bit less than 10% of the Union troops (circa 200,000
soldiers).
Whereas one could think of the desertion decision as an isolated one, historical studies
and anecdotal evidence point to the opposite. In the Confederate South, for instance, and
especially toward the end of the war, mass desertion tended to be more prevalent. In this
regard, Bearman [4] asserts that “[d]esertion rates were highest in companies that evidenced a
high degree of local homogeneity — company solidarity thus bred rather than reduced desertion
rates. There is no support for any of the historical models of desertion that search for
individual-level determinants, such as social class, occupation, status, family structure, age,
or time of enlistment”. Even if one is not as skeptical as this author about individual
and other contextual determinants of desertion, there seems to be some evidence in favor of
endogenous eﬀects. Evidence of simultaneous desertion (on both sides) is pervasive in Lonn’s
[28] volume: “Usually the recorded statements of speciﬁc instances of desertion whether from
Union or Confederate reports, show the slipping-away of individuals or of small groups,
varying from ﬁve to sixteen or twenty.” (p.152-3) The author goes on to point instances
where Union soldiers would desert by the hundreds at the same time.
From these facts, it is valid to infer that a soldier’s decision to desert probably had a
direct impact on the behavior of others in his company. If no one deserts, the social sanctions
attached to exit tend to be high; whereas if there is mass exit, such sanctions tend to be
minimized as well as the eﬀectiveness of the military company, to decrease. Furthermore,
such decision entailed costs — the probability of being caught and facing the military court.24
These two aspects are in accordance with the model we investigated previously. Another
feature of these data that is particularly helpful is the fact that recruits tended to be with
23The Civil War lasted four years: from the ﬁring at Fort Sumter on April 14, 1861 until Lee’s surrender
in Appomattox on April 1865. Its human cost was tremendous. It is estimated that 620,000 soldiers died
during the conﬂict (360,000 Union and 260,000 Confederate).
24Even though the Military Code in eﬀect at the beginning of the war mandated sanctions as harsh as
the death penalty, such punishments required the approval by the President or (later during the war) the
commanding general. According to Costa and Kahn [9], out of estimated 200,000 deserters, 80,000 were
caught, of which only 147 were executed. Specially in the early years, punishments were notoriously mild,
consisting of dismissal with loss of pay and towards the end, imprisonment for the duration of the war.
22a company since its inception and hence there was very little ﬂow of soldiers into or out of
the unit.
Whereas standard statistical duration models could be employed on the time until
desertion to identify the existence of duration dependence among agents — as indeed is
done in Costa and Kahn [9] and Sirakaya [45] and suggested in Brock and Durlauf [6] — it
is still unclear whether such eﬀects are obtained from endogenous inﬂuences or correlated
unobservables. In contrast, our model clearly separates both channels and lays out the
circumstances under which each of these sources is identiﬁable.
5.1. Data and Preliminary Analysis
The data used consist of 35,567 recruits in the Union Army during the American Civil
War. This dataset was collected by the Center for Population Economics at the University
of Chicago under the auspices of the National Institute of Health (P01 AG10120). It is
publicly available at http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu. The men are distributed across 303
military companies from all states in the Union with the exception of Rhode Island. These
companies were randomly drawn using a one-stage cluster sampling procedure and all re-
cruits for each selected company, except for commissioned oﬃcers, black recruits and some
other branches of military service, were entered into the sample. These soldiers represent
1.27% of the total military contingent in the Union and a signiﬁcant portion of the 1,696
infantry regiments in that army. According to the Center for Population Economics they
seem to be representative of the contemporary white male population who served in the
Union Army.
A number of variables is available for each recruit. These include dates of enlistment,
muster-in and discharge as well as information on promotion, AWOL (absence without leave),
desertion and furlough.25 More detailed military information from the recruit records is avail-
able and is complemented by background information and post-war history originally from
the census. We focus on the main military variables.
According to Lonn [28] (see Chapter IX), desertion was markedly higher among for-
eigners, substitutes and “bounty-jumpers”. Substitutes and “bounty-jumpers” appeared as
the government started inducing enlistment through enrollment bounties — which created
the ﬁgure of the “bounty-jumper” who would enlist, collect the reward and desert just to
25Desertion and other military events were recorded by the company oﬃcers. Some mis-measurement of
desertion is to be expected and we ignore this possibility. Records are nonetheless reported to have become
more accurate towards the end of the war, especially after the institution of the oﬃce of provost marshall
general in September, 1862 (see Lonn [28]).
23repeat the scheme in another state or county — and the possibility for draftees to hire sub-
stitutes to replace them. In the data it is possible to identify foreigners and substitutes.
In order to assess the eﬀect of “bounty-jumpers” on desertion we try the bounty amount
paid to each recruit as a proxy variable.26 Other variables are also included, such as marital
status, age and height as well as dummy variables for state and year of enlistment. The
ideal dataset would contain continuous time records for desertion. Here, an event is marked
with daily precision27 and time to desertion is measured from the earliest muster-in date for
recruits in a given company.28
One of the implications of our model is that company size will aﬀect the equilibrium
exit strategies only in the presence of endogenous eﬀects. Table 1 presents evidence of this
phenomenon. The regressions investigate the eﬀect of certain variables on the mean (log
of the) time to desertion at the individual level29 Company size is a signiﬁcant and robust
determinant for the timing of desertion. In addition to the displayed regressions, we tried
other speciﬁcations with diﬀerent combinations of independent variables. The company size
variable remains signiﬁcant in all of those. Anecdotal evidence and history texts point to a
very unsystematic enlistment process, typically held at the local level by community leaders,
which provides some justiﬁcation for assuming that the eﬀect of company size does represent
an omitted factor other than the numbers in the group.
TABLE 1 HERE
In order to further investigate the presence of endogenous eﬀects in our data, we
compute the statistics in Theorem 2 for various discretization levels. All of them yield
results that reject the null hypothesis of no endogenous eﬀects, as displayed on Table 2
below. The results are for desertions that did not occur during battles lest these represent
common shocks that discontinuously aﬀect the utility ﬂow. The conclusions are unchanged
if one includes desertions that occurred during battles.
TABLE 2 HERE
In the next subsection we proceed the analysis by structurally estimating the model
considered in the paper.
26The bounty amount was not adjusted for inﬂation, but whenever it was used year dummies were also
present which would capture nationwide inﬂation levels.
27Some deserters did not have precise dates and were thus discarded.
28Non-parametric estimation of the hazard rate suggests negative duration dependence at earlier dates
and mildly positive to no duration dependence later in the soldier’s army life.
29The regressions can be related to an Accelerated Failure Time model for the time to desertion. Similar
versions were also run at the company level with essentially the same conclusions.
245.2. Estimation
In this subsection we use a simulated minimum distance estimator to obtain the relevant pa-
rameters in the model proposed in Section 3 (see, for instance, Gouri´ eroux and Monfort [19]).
We normalize the discount rate (γ = 5% per year)30, the exit cost (C = 1) and the initial










where m : R+ −→ Rk and the second sum is taken over the simulated observations generated
under parameter ψ. The stopping times recorded are only those prior to a certain horizon T,
which in the context stands for the individual term of service in the army. We use R = 1. In
order to simulate the phenomenon we have to discretize the sample paths. The discretiza-
tion referred to below is the simulated paths discretization. Consistency and asymptotic
normality are a straightforward application of the results in Pakes and Pollard [36]:
Proposition 7 Assume
1. (Identiﬁcation) infkψ−ψ0k>δ kG(ψ)k = infkψ−ψ0k>δ kE(m(τ(ψ0))|τ(ψ0) < T)−E(m(τ(ψ))|τ(ψ0) <
T)k > 0,∀δ > 0;
2. ψ0 is in the interior of a compact parameter set;







4. τn,τr < T, for some T < ∞;
5. m(·) is C1 with bounded derivatives on (0,T);
6. The discretization error for the simulated paths is o(
√
N),
then the simulation estimators are weakly consistent and asymptotically normal with distri-
bution:
√

















and V = (1 + 1/R)var(m(τi))
30A discount rate of 5% per year was chosen. For comparison, commercial paper rates in United States
during the was ﬂuctuated between 4% and 8% (NBER Macrohistory Database).
25Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that Condition 2 requires that ∆α > 0. We assume that to be reasonable
given the test statistics obtained on Table 2. The last condition basically allows us to ignore
the discretization error in the simulation as the sample size increase. This will basically
depend on the discretization scheme used. Under the Euler scheme this requires that the
discretization grids be o(
√
N) (see Glasserman [18]). The identiﬁcation condition will be
satisﬁed if the suﬃcient conditions in Theorem 3 are shown to hold for every ψ 6= ψ0.31
An important simpliﬁcation is that we assume the thresholds to be constant: zk =
z(α − ∆α(k − 1)/(I − 1),σ,γ,C).32 The moments matched were: mean, harmonic mean,
average number of desertions in each desertion episode and percentage of soldiers leaving
before two years33. The choice of moments stems basically from the fact that, in the absence
of endogenous or correlated eﬀects, the mean and harmonic mean are ML estimators and
suﬃcient statistics for the Inverse Gaussian distribution. The following table displays the
results and normalizations used in the estimation:
TABLE 3 HERE
As indicated, the parameters are precisely estimated. The results indicate a substantial en-
dogenous eﬀects. The following exercise illustrates this point: if there are no endogenous
eﬀects, desertion times would be distributed according to a (defective) Inverse Gaussian dis-
tribution. Using as parameters for this distribution the point estimates above, one obtains
a probability of 13.90% for leaving the game before 150 days in the absence of endogenous
eﬀects. If on the other hand one-fourth of the company deserts immediately after the begin-
ning of the war for instance, the endogenous eﬀect coeﬃcient estimate implies a probability
of leaving the army before 150 days of 31.78% — an increase by a factor of more than two.34
6. Conclusion
The problem studied here is of great importance in many settings. Social welfare program
participation, bank runs, migration, marriage and divorce decisions are only a few of the
31Notice though that the conditions in Theorem 3 are suﬃcient but not necessary.
32Similar approximations can be found on the treatment of ﬁnite horizon options and seem to work
satisfactorily. Examples are Huang, Subrahmanyam and Yu [23] and Ju [24].
33Very similar results were obtained if one of the percentages substituted for the average number of
deserters at each desertion episode.
34We have also estimated the model imposing termination exogenously through death. The results are not
much diﬀerent.
26possibilities. Disentangling endogenous and correlated eﬀects is thus fundamental not only
to illuminate economic research but also to enlighten policy. The setup delineated in this pa-
per allows us to better understand the nature of endogenous and correlated eﬀects. Whereas
this problem is unfeasible in simpler settings (see Manski [31]), the separation is not clear
in other approaches that deal with similar situations (as in Brock and Durlauf [6]).
We have learned that endogenous interactions may be an important component in
multi-person timing situations. They can generate simultaneous actions with positive prob-
ability and thus interfere with usual statistical inference through standard duration models.
A few characterizations were possible and a test for the presence of endogenous inﬂuences
was delivered. Finally, structural estimation points to a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the outcome of
our particular example.
27Appendix: Proofs
Sketch of Proof for Existence of a Strong Solution
The proof that there exists a strong solution for equation 2 follows from a slight modiﬁcation
of the proof provided in Karatzas and Shreve [25], p.289. The key is to note that the iterative
construction of a solution follows through if we replace b(s,x) and σ(s,x) by b(s,x,ω) and
σ(s,x,ω) in the deﬁnition of X(k). If, for ﬁxed x, (s,ω) 7→ b(s,x,ω) and (s,ω) 7→ σ(s,x,ω)
are adapted processes, the resulting process is still adapted. The remainder of the proof is
identical. (See also Protter [39], Theorem V.7)
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider a player i ∈ I. Let the stopping strategies for I−{i} be given by the following pro-
ﬁle of stopping times τ−i = (τs)s∈I−{i}. Given Assumption 3, according to Theorem 4 in Fa-
keev [12], there exists a solution for the optimal stopping time. Let the individual i’s best re-
sponse function bi(·) map a stopping time proﬁle τ−i onto one such optimal stopping solution.
Given this, consider b(·) deﬁned as the following mapping τ = (τs)s∈I 7→ b(τ) = (bi(τ−i))i∈I.
A Nash Equilibrium is then simply a ﬁxed point for the mapping b(·). In order to establish
the existence of such a result we use the Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem, reproduced
below from Aliprantis and Border [2], p.6:
Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem: Let (X,≥) be a partially ordered set
with the property that every chain in X has a supremum. Let f : X → X be
increasing, and assume that there exists some a in X such that a ≤ f(a). Then
the set of ﬁxed points of f is nonempty and has a maximal ﬁxed point.
In the following discussion we consider the set of stopping time proﬁles and identify
two stopping times that are P-almost everywhere identical. We proceed by steps:
Step 1: (Partial order) The set of stopping times endowed with the relation ≥ deﬁned
as: τ ≥ υ if and only if P(τ(ω) ≥ γ(ω)) = 1 is partially ordered. In other words, ≥ is
reﬂexive, transitive and anti-symmetric.
Step 2: (Every chain has a supremum) Given a set of stopping times T, we should be
able to ﬁnd a stopping time τ such that 1. τ ≥ τ,∀τ ∈ T,P-a.s. and 2. if υ ≥ τ,P-a.s.,
τ ∈ T then υ ≥ τ,P-a.s.. If T is countable supτ∈T τ is a stopping time and satisﬁes conditions
1 and 2 (see Karatzas and Shreve, Lemma 1.2.11). If not, ﬁrst notice that, since the only
28structure that matters for this property is the ordering in R+, we can always assume that
the stopping times take values on [0,1] (otherwise, pick an increasing mapping from R+ onto
[0,1]). Let C be the collection of all countable subsets C ⊂ T. For each such C, deﬁne:
lC = sup
τ∈C
τ and v = sup
C∈C
E(lC) < ∞
By the previous reasoning, lC is a stopping time. Then, there is a sequence {Cn}n ⊂ C such
that v = limn→∞ E(lCn). Now deﬁne C = ∪∞
n=1Cn ∈ C. To show that lC satisﬁes condition 1.,
ﬁrst notice that C ∈ C,v ≥ E(lC). On the other hand, since Cn ⊂ C, E(lC) ≥ E(lCn) →n v.
These two imply that v = E(lC).
For an arbitrary τ ∈ T, set Cτ = {τ} ∪ C ∈ C. Now, lCτ ≥ lC. This renders v ≥
E(lCτ) ≥ E(lC) = v ⇒ E(lCτ − lC) = 0 ⇒ lCτ = lC,P-a.s. This and lCτ ≥ τ,P-a.s. in turn
imply that lC ≥ τ,P-a.s.
To see that 2. is satisﬁed, notice that, if υ ≥ τ,∀τ ∈ T, in particular, υ ≥ τ,∀τ ∈ C.
This implies that υ ≥ supτ∈C τ = lC.
Step 3: (∃a such that a ≤ f(a)) Pick a as the proﬁle of stopping times that are iden-
tically zero.
Step 4: (b(·) is increasing) This is the case if each individual best response function bi(·) is
increasing. By the version of Itˆ o’s Lemma for twice diﬀerentiable functions (see Revuz and
Yor [40], p.224, remark 3), and the fact that ui(x,t) = e−γitgi(x) is twice diﬀerentiable (since
gi(·) is twice diﬀerentiable), e−γitgi(x) obeys the following stochastic diﬀerential equation












































where the µ(·,·,·) and β(·,·,·) denote the drift and dispersion coeﬃcients of e−γitgi(xi
t). If
gi(·) is increasing and convex and if αi(·,·,·) and σi(·,·,·) are decreasing in θ, the above drift
is decreasing in θ.
29Now consider a proﬁle of stopping times τ−i and υ−i such that τ−i dominates υ−i,P- a.s.
Moving from one proﬁle to another will impact θ and this will have eﬀects on both the drift
and the dispersion coeﬃcients of e−γitgi(xi
t).
The eﬀect on the dispersion coeﬃcient does not aﬀect the objective function of an indi-
vidual agent. This obtains from the fact that g0(·) is bounded and the Bound on Volatility













for some K ∈ R. This in turn implies that zt =
R t
0(e−γsg0(xs)σ(xs,θs,s))dW i
s is a mar-




s] = 0,∀τ where τ is an (Ft)-stopping time (see Karatzas
and Shreve [25], p.19).









the stopping decisions for the proﬁles τ−i and υ−i) we will have µ(x,θ
i,υ
t ,t) ≤ µ(x,θ
i,τ
t ,t),P-
almost surely, ∀x,t. Letting y
i,τ
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s ) ≥ 0,∀0 ≤ s ≤ t < ∞] = 1
30This suﬃces to show that it is not proﬁtable for agent i to stop earlier when the proﬁle is τ−i
than when the proﬁle is υ−i. Suppose not. Then, let A = {bi(τ−i) < bi(υ−i)}. According to
Lemma 1.2.16 in Karatzas and Shreve [25], A ∈ Fbi(τ−i)∩Fbi(υ−i). By the above result we can








bi(τ−i)]}. The RHS expression in this
inequality is positive because A ∈ Fbi(τ−i) ∩ Fbi(υ−i) = Fbi(τ−i)∧bi(υ−i) which implies that the
agent would do better by picking bi(τ−i) ∧ bi(υ−i) if the RHS were negative. But this would
contradict the fact that bi(υ−i) is a best response. So, if A 6= Ø, delaying the response by
choosing bi(υ−i) ∨ bi(τ−i) would improve the agent’s payoﬀ given that the remaining agents
are playing τ−i. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Let the breaks in the drift arrive randomly at the stopping times νk with corresponding
arrival rates λk(t;ω). In other words, let k ∈ {0,1,...,n} describe the regime in which the
drift coeﬃcient is α − k∆α and the hazard rate at t for moving from state k to state k + 1
is given by λk(t,ω). Since 0 = ν0 ≤ ν1 ≤ ··· ≤ νk, λk(t;ω) = 0 if t < νk−1(ω). The value




γτ(xτ − C)|xt = x,kt = k]




x − C,(1 + γdt)−1{λk(t)dtE[J(x + dx,k + 1,t)|x] +
(1 − λk(t)dt)E[J(x + dx,k,t)|x]}
o
, k ≤ n − 1
and J(x,n,t) = J(x), which is the value function for the optimal stopping problem when the
log-linear diﬀusion has the lowest drift. In the continuation region, the second argument in
the right-hand expression is the largest of the two and it can be seen that the value function
satisﬁes:
(γ + λk(t))J(x,k,t) ≥ AkJ(x,k,t) + Jt(x,k,t) + λk(t)J(x,k + 1,t).
where Ak is the inﬁnitesimal generator for a log-linear diﬀusion with drift coeﬃcient α−k∆α.
The left-hand side indicates the loss from waiting one inﬁnitesimal instant whereas the right
hand side stands for the beneﬁt of waiting one inﬁnitesimal — the expected appreciation in
the value function. This expression holds in the continuation region and the typical
J(zk(t),k,t) = zk(t) − C, ∀t (value matching)
Jx(zk(t),k,t) = 1, ∀t (smooth ﬁt)
31implicitly deﬁne the thresholds zk.
More rigorously35, let J : R++ × {1,...,n} × R+ → R be twice diﬀerentiable on its ﬁrst
argument with an absolutely continuous ﬁrst derivative such that:
1. J(x,k,t) ≥ x − C;
2. −γJ(x,k,t) + AkJ(x,k,t) + Jt(x,k,t) + λk(t)(J(x,k + 1,t) − J(x,k,t)) ≤ 0, with
equality if J(x,k,t) > x − C;




Let Sk = {(x,t) : J(x,k,t) ≤ x − C} be the stopping region when the regime is k and




−γτ(xτ − C)|xt = x,kt = k]
and τ∗ attains the supremum.
To see this, consider a stopping time τ and let τm = τ ∧ m. Then (2), (3) and Dynkin’s
formula (Rogers and Williams [41], p.252-4) deliver that
J(x,k,t) ≥ E[e
−γτmJ(xτm,kτm,τm)|xt = x,kt = k].
Using (1):
J(x,k,t) ≥ E[e
−γτm(xτm − C)|xt = x,kt = k].
By Fatou’s Lemma, liminfm E[e−γτm(xτm −C)|xt = x,kt = k] ≥ E[e−γτ(xτ −C)|xt = x,kt =
k] and we have that
J(x,k,t) ≥ E[e
−γτ(xτ − C)|xt = x,kt = k].
for an arbitrary stopping time τ. Using (2) and (3) plus Dynkin’s formula one can then
obtain that τ∗ attains the supremum. The value matching and smooth pasting conditions
are then consequences of J being C1. As explained earlier, these two conditions implicitly
deﬁne the thresholds zk(t).
That zk(t) > zk+1(t),∀t can be seen in the following manner. Let xt(x,k) be the process
35The reasoning is in the spirit of similar arguments in Kobila [27] and Scheinkman and Zariphopoulou [42].
32initialized at the level x and regime k. Since the drift in successive states are strictly smaller,
a comparison result such as the one in Karatzas and Shreve [25], Proposition V.2.18, or
Protter [39], Theorem V.54, can be established to show that:
e
−γt(xt(x,k) − C) > e
−γt(xt(x,k + 1) − C), ∀t P-a.s.
This should be enough to imply that the maximum attainable value is decreasing in k:
J(x,k,t) > J(x,k + 1,t), ∀t.
Consequently,
J(zk(t),k,t) > J(zk(t),k + 1,t), ∀t.
So, stopping at regime k implies stopping at regime k + 1 whereas the opposite does not
hold. This suﬃces to argue that
zk(t) > zk+1(t), ∀t k ∈ {1,...,n − 1}. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: (Optimal policy characterization) As in Proposition 1, the value function char-
acterizes the thresholds. Notice though that at any instant t the probability that another
individual’s latent utility process hits the stopping region in the next inﬁnitesimal given
that it has not occurred so far is negligible, since this process is a diﬀusion. As time goes
by though the likelihood that such an event occurs increases towards one and the value of
staying should decrease accordingly. So, we require the function in the limit to agree with
the value function in the next regime, which ultimately brings it to the lowest drift regime.
Let Ji(x,k,t) = supτ≥t E[eγτ(xi
τ − Ci)|xi
t = x,ki
t = k] be the value function for individual
i ∈ I. Following the steps in Proposition 1, one can see that
1. Ji(x,k,t) ≥ x − Ci;
2. −γJi(x,k,t) + Ai
kJi(x,k,t) + Ji
t(x,k,t) ≤ 0, with equality if Ji(x,k,t) > x − Ci;
3. limt→∞ Ji(x,k,t) = J
i(x).
where J
i(x) is the value function for the optimal stopping problem with the lowest drift
log-linear diﬀusion.




m(t) − Ci, ∀t (value matching)
Ji
x(zi
m(t),m,t) = 1, ∀t (smooth ﬁt)
As before zi
m(t) > zi
m+1(t), ∀t m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
Step 2: (Stopping times are an increasing sequence) Notice that, by deﬁnition, τ0 ≤ τ1 ≤
··· ≤ τI and consequently form an increasing sequence of stopping times.
Step 3: (At each stage at least one agent stops) ∀k ∈ I,∃j : τ∗
j = τk.
Take a stopping time τk. There are two possibilities, represented by two disjoint subsets
of Ω, say Ω1 and Ω2:
1. Ω1. The vector process Ak−1xt hits Ak−1SI+1−10Ak−11 where (∃i ∈ I : xi ≥ zi
k and ∀j 6=
i,xj < z
j
k+1). In this case, τ∗
i (ω) = τk(ω) (provided i hasn’t stopped yet), ∀ω ∈ Ω1.
2. Ω2. The above does not happen. In this case, ∃j : z
j
k+1 ≤ xj
τk (provided j hasn’t





this implies that τ∗
j (ω) = τk+1(ω) = τk(ω),∀ω ∈ Ω2.
This means that, at each stopping time τk, the drift of xi drops by ∆αi/(I − 1).
Step 4: (τ∗
i is optimal) Apply Proposition 1.
This establishes that the equilibrium can be represented through the hitting times. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: (The strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium) Set ν = τ∗
j in Proposition 2. Consider
τi = inf{t : xt > zi(t)}, where zi(t) is obtained as in Proposition 2. Agent i should use τi on
{τi < τ∗
j } and inf{t > τ∗
j : xi




τS = zi(t) ⇒ τi = τS
34When the vector process hits S on the subset where xi = zi(t), the hitting times for the
vector process to reach S and for the component process to hit zi(t) coincide. Since τ∗
j ≥ τS
by construction, we should also conclude that:
{x
i
τS = zi(t)} ⊂ {τi ≤ τ
∗
j }
Agent i should then use τi (which coincides with τS on this set).
On the other hand,
x
i




τS > zj ⇒ τ∗
j = τS)
⇒ τi > τ
∗
j
So, we are in the complementary set, in which it is sensible to use inf{t > τ∗
j : xi
t > zi} =
inf{t > τS : xi
t > zi}.
Step 2: (The equilibrium is unique) To see that this is the unique equilibrium, notice
that
1. This is the unique equilibrium in which x1
τ∗
1∧τ∗
2 = z1(t) or x2
τ∗
1∧τ∗
2 = z2(t). In other
words, any equilibrium proﬁle of stopping strategies will have at least one stopper in
the ﬁrst round of exits at his or her threshold;
2. If there is another equilibrium, it should then involve ﬁrst stoppers quitting at points
lower than their initial thresholds. If only one agent drops, this can be shown to be
suboptimal according to the reasoning of Proposition 2. If both stop at the same time
and since P({1 = 2}) = 0, there is an incentive for one of the agents to deviate and
wait.

Proof of Proposition 4
Let S = {(x,t) ∈ RI
++ × R+ : ∃i such that xi ≥ zi
1 = z(αi,σi,Ci,γi,∆αi,t)} and τS =
inf{t > 0 : xt ∈ S}. Since the sample paths are continuous P-almost surely, by Theorem
2.6.5 in Port and Stone [38] the distribution of (xτS,τS) will be concentrated on ∂S. Also,
it is true that P(τS < ∞) > 0.
35(Suﬃciency) If there are endogenous eﬀects, zi
1(t) > zi
2(t),∀t i ∈ I. There will be si-
multaneous exit whenever zi
1 ≥ xi
τS ≥ zi
2, for some i ∈ I. This has positive probability as
long as zi
1(τS) > zi
2(τS),i ∈ I. In order to see this, ﬁrst notice that the latent utilities process











t, i = 1,...,I
where Bt is an I-dimensional Brownian motion (with independent components) and ˜ σI×I =
[˜ σij]. Let ∂SH = {(x,t) ∈ ∂S : zi
1(t) ≥ xi ≥ zi
2}. By Corollary II.2.11.2 in Gihman and
Skorohod [17] (p.308), one gets that P[(xτS,τS) ∈ ∂SH] = u(x,t) is an A-harmonic function
in C = Sc. In other words,
Au(x) + ut(x,t) = 0 in C
u(x,t) = 1 if (x,t) ∈ ∂SH




















is the inﬁnitesimal generator associated with the above diﬀusion. By the Minimum Principle
for elliptic operators (see Proposition 4.1.3 in Port and Stone [38] or Section 6.4 in Evans [11]),
if u attains a minimum (which in this case would be zero) on C, it is constant on C. This would
in turn imply that ∀(x,t) ∈ C,u(x) = P[(xτS,τS) ∈ ∂SH|x0 = x] = 0. But by Proposition
2.3.6 in Port and Stone [38], one can deduce that u(x,t) = P[(xτS,τS) ∈ ∂SH|x0 = x] 6= 0.
(Necessity) If there are no endogenous eﬀects, one agent’s drift is never aﬀected by the exit of
other agents. Each agent’s decision is given by τ∗
i = inf{t ∈ R+ : xi
t > zi = z(αi,σi,Ci,γi)}.
There will be clustering only if τ∗
i = τ∗
j ,i 6= j. The state-variable vector can be represented
as above until the killing time τS. Then, there will be clustering only if xt hits S at the point
(zi)i∈I. But in I ≥ 2 dimensions any one-point set A is polar with respect to a Brownian
motion, i.e., P[τA < ∞] = 0 where τA is the hitting time for A (Proposition 2.2.5 in Port
and Stone [38]). So, P[τ∗
i = τ∗
j ,i 6= j] = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 5
If there are no endogenous eﬀects, the equilibrium strategies are characterized by the thresh-
olds z(α,σ,γ,C). The marginal distribution for these are then (possibly defective) Inverse




































(see Whitmore [48]). Notice that the expression does not depend on I and this completes
the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2
We start out by proving the conditions for Lyapunov’s Central Limit Theorem (see Pagan
and Ullah [37], p.358) for an arbitrary combination of yn,∆N,1 and yn,∆N,2.




































and observe that, provided (α1,α2,α3) 6= (0,0,0), ζN(0,0,0) = 0 ⇔ p(0) = 0 (since p(0) =
0 ⇔ v(0) = 0). Consider then
Ln,N =
P











for some δ > 0. That this is the case can be seen because
PN
n=1 E|Ln,N|2+δ =
A z }| {
N
1−(1+δ/2)(1−κ)











37We set κ = ε if p(0) = 0 (Assumption 1 holds) and κ = 0, otherwise.
For C, observe that
C ≤
P





i + (αip(∆N,i))2+δ] −→




With respect to B, imposing κ = 0 and assuming that p(0) > 0, one has
ζN(∆N,1,∆N,2,∆N,3) → ζN(0,0,0) > 0.
In case p(0) = 0, notice that ζN(·,·,·) is a function of p(·). This being diﬀerentiable, by the

















where 0 ≤ b ∆N,k ≤ ∆N,k,k = 1,2,3 and ∂ζN(·,·,·) is the gradient vector for ζN(·,·,·). We






















































































































i ζN(0,0,0) > 0
where ki,i = 1,2,3 are positive constants by Assumption 2. This suﬃces to show that B
converges to a ﬁnite value.
If p(0) > 0, A = N−δ/2 −→ 0. When p(0) = 0, we can drive A to zero by choosing
δ > 0 so that
δ > 2((1 − ε)
























































Step 2: (Delta Method) By the uniform delta method (see van der Vaart [47], Theorem


































































































































































































as long as  > 1/3.
If p(0) > 0, it is possible to see that the statistic diverges using similar arguments. 
For the next theorem we will make use of the following result (Theorem 1 in Ara´ ujo and
Mas-Colell [3]), which we cite as a lemma.
40Lemma 1 (Theorem 1 in Ara´ ujo and Mas-Colell [3]) Let Ψ be a topological space, E ⊂
Rn,1 ≤ n ≤ ∞ and ν denote a Borel probability measure on Rn. Assume the following:
1. (Ψ × Ψ)\∆ is a Lindel¨ of space (i.e. any open cover has a countable subcover), where
∆ = {(x,y) ∈ Ψ × Ψ : x = y}.
2. F : Ψ × E → R is a continuous function.
3. ∀i,ψ ∈ Ψ and a ∈ E,∂aiF(ψ,a) exists and depends continuously on ψ and a.
4. ν is a product probability measure, each factor being absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure.
5. (Identiﬁcation Condition)36 If F(ψ,a) = F( ˆ ψ,a),ψ 6= ˆ ψ, then ∂ai(F(ψ,a)−F( ˆ ψ,a)) 6=
0 for some i.
Then, for ν-a.e. a ∈ E, the function F(·,a) : Ψ → R has at most one maximizer.
Proof of Theorem 3
Step 1: Consider the expected log-likelihood function conditioned on w:
KL(ψ, ˆ ψ,w) =
Z
log[g(t; ˆ ψ,w)]g(t;ψ,w)dt
From the properties of the Kullback-Leibler information criterion (or relative entropy) for
two probability distributions, it is obtained that ˆ ψ is maximizes the expected log-likelihood
if and only if g(t; ˆ ψ,w) = g(t;ψ,w) (see Schervish [44], Proposition 2.92). In particular,
ˆ ψ = ψ is one such maximizer.
Step 2: Take Ψ = {ψ, ˆ ψ}. Also, let wi = (wc
i,wd
i) where wc
i denotes the continuous random
covariates and wd
i, those with a discrete component. Now, for each ﬁxed value in the support
of (wd
i)i∈I, notice that:
1. Ψ is trivially Lindel¨ of since it is compact37
36This condition is named the Sondermann condition in Ara´ ujo and Mas-Collel [3]. We change its denom-
ination to better suit our application.
37We could allow for Ψ to be a subset of RK. R2K is Lindel¨ of since it is separable and metrizable and
thus, second countable (see Aliprantis and Border [2], Theorem 3.1). This implies that it is Lindel¨ of (see
Aliprantis and Border [2], p.45).
412. The Kullback-Leibler information criterion is continuous on the parameters and w. In
order to obtain this result, notice that





G(t;ψ) = P(τ > t;ψ) = E[I{sups≤t xi
s(ψ)−z(t;ψ)>0 for some i}] = E[φ((xs)
t
s=0)|x0 = x]
The derivative of this last expression with respect to the parameters is well deﬁned
and can be obtained through Malliavin calculus (see Proposition 3.1 in Fourni´ e et al.
[13] for the drift, for example). The assumption that α(·) is a continuous function on
the covariates achieves the result.
3. The derivative exists and is continuous since we assume that α(·) is of class C1 with
respect to the continuous random variables.
4. Pick any product measure ν equivalent to the measure represented by the CDF Fwc.
Since the latter is assumed continuous, its measure is absolutely continuous with re-
spect to the Lebesgue measure and ν is also absolutely continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure.
5. The Identiﬁcation Condition holds by assumption.
By Lemma 1, there is at most one maximizer for the expected log-likelihood function Fwc-
a.e. for each element in the support of wd and we know that ψ maximizes it. The statement
is easily extended Fw-a.e. since the support of wd is countable and the union of countable
events with null measure — there being more than one maximizer — has zero measure.

Proof of Proposition 6
Notice that (for t ∈ [0,τS]) the vector process with the latent utilities can be represented as










t, i ∈ I
Let S = S((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α,t) = {x ∈ RI
+ : ∃i such that xi ≥ zi
1(t) ≡ z1(αi,σ,γ,C,∆α,t)}
and denote by A((αi)i∈I,ρ,σ) the inﬁnitesimal generator associated with the above diﬀusion
42(where the argument reminds the reader of the dependence of the operator on the parame-




























for f in the appropriate domain (see Karatzas and Shreve [25], p.281).
Denote by τS ≡ inf{t : xt ∈ S} = inf{t : ∃i such that xi ≥ zi
1(t) ≡ z1(αi,σ,γ,C,∆α,t)} =
inf{t : ∃i such that ˆ xi ≡ xi−(zi(t)−zi(0)) ≥ zi(0)}. Let G(t,x) be the probability that the
diﬀusion will reach S after t. In other words, G(t,x) = P[τS > t|x0 = x] and represents the
survival function for the exit time distribution of the ﬁrst deserter. Following Gardiner [15],
Subsection 5.4.2, this probability can be conveniently written as the solution to the following




in Ct=0((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α), t > 0 with the following conditions:
G(0,x) = P[τS < ∞|x0 = x], x ∈ Ct=0((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α)
G(t,x) = 0, x ∈ St=0((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α) and t ≥ 0
where the boundary condition follows since ∂St=0((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α) ⊂
St=0((αi)i∈I,σ,γ,C,∆α) and because 0 is an absorbing boundary for xi,i ∈ I.
Uniqueness is obtained in Theorem 4, Section 7.1.2 in Evans [11]. 
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof follows from the conditions in Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 in Pakes and Pollard [36]. It
is analogous to Example 4.1 in that paper, in which the authors check for these conditions
in the stopping model by Pakes [35].
With exception of condition (ii) in Theorem 3.3, the conditions follow pretty much along
the same lines as in that example, so we omit them here. Condition (ii) requires that G(·)
be diﬀerentiable at ψ0 with derivative matrix Γ, full rank. We prove here that G(·) is diﬀer-
entiable at ψ0. That the matrix is of full rank is assumed in the statement of the proposition.
For τ < T, we would like to establish that G(ψ) = Ex[m(τ(ψ))|τ(ψ) < T] is diﬀerentiable at
43ψ0. In order to do this we use Proposition 1 in Broadie and Glasserman [5]. The proposition
consists in imposing condition (A1-A4) for the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem
so that the expectation of a derivative is equal to the derivative of the expectation.
First, we check for the conditions that focus on the diﬀerentiability of each realization of the
random variable m(τ). Letting Bt,discr(ω) be a discretized draw for the (continuous time)
I-dimensional Brownian motion governing the behavior of the state variable processes. For






s + σBs,discr(ω)} = logz(θτ(ω;ψ)(ω,ψ),ψ).
The implicit function theorem guarantees that τ(ω;ψ) is diﬀerentiable w.r.t. ψ with proba-
bility one. This takes cares of A1.
The assumption that m(·) is diﬀerentiable and has bounded derivatives on (0,T) is used
to satisfy A2 and A3.
The fact that the parameter space is compact guarantees that the derivative of τ(ω;ψ)
is bounded by an integrable random variable and thus condition A4 is satisﬁed.
This delivers existence of the derivative as the discretization window goes to zero. 
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48Figure 1: Sequential Stopping
Figure 2: Simultaneous Stopping
49Table 1: Individual Regressions
Dependent variable: log(Days Until Desertion)
Coef. t P> |t| Coef. t P> |t|
(Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Company Size 0.0020 3.43 0.00 0.0019 3.08 0.00
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Bounty Paid 0.0015 2.36 0.02
(0.0006)
Foreigner -0.2144 -4.25 0.00
(0.0504)
Substitute 0.1874 1.88 0.06
(0.0996)
Age -0.0095 -2.86 0.00
(0.0033)
Height 0.0256 2.70 0.01
(0.0095)
State Controls: Yes Yes
Year Controls: Yes Yes
Number of obs = 3337 3237
R-squared = 0.2983 0.3076
† Standard errors are robust standard errors.















∆2/∆1 ∆3/∆1 y∆1 y∆2 y∆3 Test Statistic
2 3 0.002289 0.002693 0.002859 -6.25
2 5 0.002289 0.002693 0.003358 -11.31
2 10 0.002289 0.002693 0.004210 -13.18
3 4 0.002289 0.002859 0.003216 -13.05
3 5 0.002289 0.002859 0.003358 -16.99
3 10 0.002289 0.002859 0.004210 -20.95
† ∆1 = 1 day. All 303 companies were used.
Table 3: Model Estimation
ˆ α ˆ ∆α ˆ σ ˆ ρ
0.0438 0.0050 5.8610 0.1008
(0.0113) (0.0000) (0.0219) (0.0040)
(per year) (per year) (per year)
† Initial position = 1. Exit cost = 0.1. Discount
rate = 5% per year.
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